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SELLER'S RECOVERY OF LOST PROFITS FOR BREACH OF
A SALES CONTRACT: UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE SECTION 2-708(2)
Uniform Commercial Code section 2-708(2) was enacted to furnish a vehicle for
sellers to recover lost profits. Although the section is poorly drafted judicial inter-
pretation has spawned a sound body of caselaw providing sellers with a ffrm basts
upon which to recover lost profits. This Note discusses the Code section and judi-
cial interpretations and concludes that in many situations 2-708(2) is the only
remedy that will make a seller whole after a contract has been breached
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I. INTRODUCTION
The goal of virtually every seller of goods is to earn a reward for his
efforts in the form of profits. Therefore, to be made whole after a sales
contract is breached by a buyer, the seller's damage recovery must in-
clude the profit he expected to earn on the sale.'
Many practitioners are not aware of the availability of lost profit re-
covery under U.C.C. section 2-708(2), a section "enacted in such a
gnarled mutation that it . . . barely -accomodates some of the cases for
which it was originally designed."2 This Note discusses the different ele-
1. The aim of courts in awarding damages for breach of contract is to place the
aggrieved party, as nearly as possible, in the same position as complete performance would
have done. See, e.g., Willhelm Lubrication Co. v. Brattrud, 197 Minn. 626, 632, 268 N.W.
634, 637 (1936); Silberstein v. Duluth News Tribune Co., 68 Minn. 430, 432, 71 N.W. 622,
633 (1897); 2 T. SEDGWICK, MEASURE OF DAMAGES § 602 (8th ed. 1891); RESTATEMENT
OF CONTRACTS § 329 comment (a) (1932).
There are two frequently discussed purposes of contract damages. One is to prevent
breaches. A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1002 (rev. ed. 1964). The second is to provide relief
to promisees to redress breaches, thereby protecting the promisee's expectations and en-
couraging the formation of contracts. Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract, 70
COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1147 (1970); Speidel & Clay, Seller's Recovey of Overhead Under
UCC Section 2-708(2)." Economic Cost Theory and Contract Remedial Policy, 57 CORNELL L.
REV. 681, 684 (1972).
2. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COM-
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ments used to calculate a seller's damages under 2-708(2). It then exam-
ines the three general types of sellers eligible for lost profit recovery under
the Uniform Commercial Code. The Note concludes that lost profit
damages is an important, though underused, remedy available to many
deserving sellers.
II. LOST PROFIT RECOVERY BEFORE THE U.C.C.
Historically, aggrieved sellers were awarded damages which guaran-
teed them the same value for the contract goods as they would have re-
ceived from the buyer's full performance. The primary remedy was to
award the difference between the contract price and the market price of
the goods (contract-market damages). 3 Another closely related and often
used remedy was to award the difference between the contract price and
the price which the seller received from reselling the goods (contract-
resale damages). 4 Under these two remedies, if the market or resale
value of the goods was less than the contract price, the buyer was re-
quired to make up the difference. Finally, in some circumstances, a seller
was awarded the full contract price.5 These three remedies assume that
if the seller receives the full contract value of the goods, he will receive
precisely what he would have received from full performance of the con-
tract, including his profit.
Certain sellers, however, are not placed in the same position as full
performance by receiving the contract value of the goods.6 The lost Vol-
MERCIAL CODE § 7-13, at 288 (2d ed. 1980). Since the Uniform Commercial Code was
first enacted in Pennsylvania in 1953, all United States jurisdictions except Louisiana have
adopted some form of it. For an extensive discussion of the Uniform Commercial Code's
legislative history, see Braucher, The Legislative Histoy of the Uniform Commercial Code, 58
COLUM. L. REV. 798 (1958).
Uniform Commercial Code citations in.this Note are to the 1978 official text. Minne-
sota's Uniform Commercial Code is codified at MINN. STAT. ch. 336 (1982).
3. For example, according to the Uniform Sales Act, MINN. STAT. ch. 512, repealedby
Uniform Commercial Code, ch. 811, 1965 Minn. Laws 1290, 1484 (codified at MINN.
STAT. ch. 336 (1982 & Supp. 1983)) in an action for damages for nonacceptance of goods,
where there is an available market for the goods in question and no special circumstances
showing proximate damage of a greater amount, the measure of damages is "the differ-
ence between the contract price and the contract or current price at the time or times
when the goods ought to have been accepted, or, if no time was fixed for acceptance, then
at the time of refusal to accept." Id § 512.64(3).
4. See, e.g., Uniform Sales Act, MINN. STAT. ch. 512 (repealed 1965). In the Uniform
Commercial Code, the contract-resale measure of damages is set forth in section 2-706.
5. Under the Uniform Sales Act a seller could bring an action for the contract price
under three circumstances: (1) when the property in the goods passed to the buyer and
the buyer wrongfully neglected or refused to pay for them; (2) when the price was payable
on a certain day and the buyer wrongfully neglected or refused to pay; or (3) when the
buyer refused to accept completed goods which could not be reasonably resold. MINN.
STAT. § 512.63 (repealed 1965).
6. The lost volume seller, see infra notes 114-45 and accompanying text, the compo-
nents seller, see t)fra notes 75-113 and accompanying text, and the jobber seller, see infia
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ume seller is one. 7 The lost volume seller has enough goods to supply as
many buyers as he can find. When one buyer breaches and the contract
goods are resold, the lost volume seller loses the profit he expected to
make on the sale to the breaching buyer.8 The profit lost on the
breached contract cannot be recovered if the buyer is required to pay
only the difference between the contract price and the resale or market
price of the goods.9 Without recovery of the profit, the lost volume seller
is not placed in the same position as full performance of the contract
would have placed him.
The three traditional remedy formulas 1 are also inadequate when ap-
plied to sellers not in possession of finished goods after the breach. Such
sellers fall into two groups: components sellers I in the midst of produc-
tion at the time of the breach and jobber sellersl2 who have not acquired
notes 146-61 and accompanying text, require recovery of lost profits to be put in the same
position as full performance.
The earliest recognized type of seller who was inadequately compensated by the three
standard remedies was the automobile dealer who resold an automobile which was the
subject of the breached contract. The negligible difference between the contract price and
the car's resale or market value meant that the dealer was left with no recovery under
conventional remedies. To avoid the contract-market damage measure mandated by Uni-
form Sales Act § 64(3), see supra note 3, and award lost profits, courts found "special cir-
cumstances" involved in the sale of automobiles. Courts held that each automobile sale
necessitated the expenditure of considerable time, effort, and service which would go en-
tirely uncompensated under the contract-market standard. See Torkomian v. Russell, 90
Conn. 481, 97 A. 760 (1916); Stewart v. Hansen, 62 Utah 281, 218 P. 959 (1923) (seller lost
compensation for time and effort of attempting to sell the car and received nothing for
rent, advertising, and other overhead expenses). But see A. Lenobel, Inc. v. Senif, 252 A.D.
533, 300 N.Y.S. 226 (1937) (lost profit damages denied to dealer who resold automobile at
same price as contract price).
The lost volume characteristics of automobile dealers were also recognized as a basis
of lost profit awards. See Note, Sales-Seller's Remedis-Refusal of the Buyer to Accept the
Goods--Seller's Measure of Damages, 21 MINN. L. REv. 716, 726-28 (1937).
7. See ztnfa notes 114-45 and accompanying text.
8. The sales volume of a seller without enough goods to supply every buyer is limited
by the number of goods he can produce or acquire. A breach allows this seller to resell the
contract goods to a buyer whom, but for the breach, he would not have been able to
supply. Therefore, the seller's sales volume and potential profit are unaffected by the
breach.
The lost volume seller, however, can sell goods to as many buyers as he can find.
When one buyer breaches, the lost volume seller resells to a buyer whom he would have
been able to supply even if the breach had not occurred. The breach, therefore, reduces
his sales volume and his potential profit. See in/fa notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
9. The difference between the contract price of the goods and their resale or market
price bears no relationship to the profit the lost seller would have made on the breached
contract.
10. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
11. A components seller assembles or manufactures goods for a buyer. See in/fa notes
75-113 and accompanying text.
12. A jobber seller buys goods from a manufacturer or another wholesaler and sells
them at a higher price. See zn/a note 146 and accompanying text.
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the contract goods at the time of the breach. When the seller has no
finished goods on hand, resale is not possible, and any relationship be-
tween the seller's damages and the contract price-market price differen-
tial is purely coincidental.13 Moreover, the absence of finished goods
precludes the recovery of the contract price.14 A different remedy must
be applied to properly compensate these sellers.
The failure of the three standard remedy formulas to adequately com-
pensate some sellers led to the adoption of a fourth measure of damages:
the profits the aggrieved seller would have received from the buyer's full
performance.I 5 Historically, however, courts disfavored lost profit recov-
ery due to its speculative and conjectural nature.' 6 Because profits are
13. The contract-market formula assumes that the seller can recover the market value
of the goods through resale. If the seller has no goods to place on the market, the contract-
market price differential bears no relationship to the seller's actual loss.
14. Under the Uniform Sales Act, if a seller did not complete or acquire the contract
goods, he could only bring an action for price if the contract price was payable irrespective
of delivery of the goods. See, e.g., Sherman Nursery Co. v. Aughenbaugh, 93 Minn. 201,
100 N.W. 1101 (1904) ("except where the purchase price of goods is payable irrespective of
their delivery, if the buyer repudiates the sale while it is executory, and prevents the seller
from performing on his part by making delivery of the goods, the seller cannot maintain
an action on the contract for the purchase price"); McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v.
Balfany, 78 Minn. 370, 81 N.W. 10 (1899) ("before a seller can maintain an action for the
agreed price of a chattel, there must be such a delivery, actual or constructive, as will pass
the title, and vest the ownership of the property to the purchaser"). Under the U.C.C., a
seller may recover the price: (1) when goods have been accepted by the buyer; (2) when
conforming goods have been lost or damaged after the risk of loss has passed to the buyer;
or (3) when goods have been identified to the contract and the seller is unable to resell
them. U.C.C. § 2-709. If the seller does not complete manufacture of the goods or does
not acquire them, the goods can never be identified to the contract nor be accepted or
conforming. See Detroit Power Screwdriver Co. v. Ladney, 25 Mich. App. 478, 181
N.W.2d 828 (1970) (2-709 not applicable where the machine under contract was never
completed but stored in a partially finished state); J. WHITE AND R. SUMMERS, supra note
2, § 7-5.
15. See, e.g., Willhelm Lubrication Co., 197 Minn. 626, 268 N.W. 634 (damages are prop-
erly measured by the difference between the contract price and the entire cost of the goods
to the seller in order to include the profit to which the seller is entitled); Green v. Lovejoy,
155 Minn. 241, 193 N.W. 173 (1923) (measure of damages for timber not manufactured is
the difference between the contract price and the cost to the seller of manufacturing and
delivering the lumber); Baessetti v. Schenango Furnace Co., 122 Minn. 335, 142 N.W. 322
(1913) (where goods are to be manufactured to fill a contract and the buyer renounces the
contract before manufacture is complete, the measure of damages is the difference be-
tween the contract price and the seller's cost of completing the contract); Masterton v.
Mayor of Brooklyn, 7 Hill 61 (N.Y. 1845). For a discussion of Masterton, see infra notes 19-
23 and accompanying text.
16. R. DUNN, RECOVERY OF DAMAGES FOR LOST PROFITS § 1.1 (2d ed. 1978); W.
HALE & R. COOLEY, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 32 (2d ed. 1912); 1 T.
SEDGWICK, MEASURE OF DAMAGES § 175 (9th ed. 1912). But see Masterton, 7 Hill 61.
The defendant in Masterton argued that a claim for damage based on the gains the
plaintiffs would have received from full performance exceeded the measure of damages
allowed at common law for breach of an executory contract. Such a claim, the defendants
insisted, "is simply a claim for the profits anticipated from a supposed good bargain and
[Vol. I11
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contingent on market prices of materials, operating efficiency, and other
uncertainties, courts were reluctant to award lost profit damages.'
7
Courts made an exception to the general rule against lost profit recov-
ery when the aggrieved party could prove the lost profits with reasonable
certainty.18 In Masterton v. Mayor of Brooklyn, 19 an 1845 New York case
considered the leading American case on the subject of lost profit dam-
ages, 20 the defendant argued that lost profits were too remote and specu-
lative to be recoverable. 2 1 The court disagreed and awarded the
aggrieved seller the difference between the contract price and the seller's
cost of fulfilling the contract. 22 The court held that no speculation was
necessary because the cost of production could be established by using
the market price of the elements of the seller's performance at the time of
the breach.
23
Minnesota courts also recognized the need for a lost profit remedy. In
1926, the Minnesota Supreme Court in Wilhelm Lubrication Co. v. Brat-
trud 24 awarded lost profits25 because they were the only way to place the
... [is] too uncertain, speculative and remote to form the basis of a recovery." Id. at 66.
The court disagreed and awarded the difference between the contract price and the cost of
production. Id at 73.
17. Cf Ludwigsen v. Larsen, 227 Mich. 528, 198 N.W. 900 (1924). The Ludwlksen
court stated, however, that if the parties contemplated profits, in certain circumstances the
jury should be permitted to consider them with the other proof in determining just compen-
sation. Id at 531, 198 N.W. at 901.
18. See, e.g., Willhelm Lubrication Co., 197 Minn. 626, 268 N.W. 634; Lovejby, 155 Minn.
241, 193 N.W. 173.
19. 7 Hill 61 (N.Y. 1845).
20. See United States v. Speed, 75 U.S. 77, 85 (1868); M & R Contractors & Builders
v. Michael, 215 Md. 340, 139 A.2d 350 (1958).
21. 7 Hill at 67.
22. Id at 71.
23. Id In deciding that lost profits are a proper measure of damages in certain cir-
cumstances, the court stated:
[P]rofits or advantages which are the direct and immediate fruits of the contract
entered into between the parties . . . are part and parcel of the contract itself,
entering into and constituting a portion of its very elements; something stipu-
lated for, the right to enjoyment of which is just as clear and plain as to the
fullfillment [sic] of any other stipulation. They are presumed to have been taken
into consideration and deliberated upon before the contract was made, and
formed perhaps the only inducement to the arrangement. . . . [I]t is difficult to
comprehend why, in case one party has deprived the other of the gains or profits
of the contract by refusing to perform it, this loss should not constitute a proper
item in estimating damages.
Id at 69.
24. 197 Minn. 626, 268 N.W. 634 (1926).
25. The Wilhelm Lubrication Co. court calculated lost profits according to the standard
set forth in the Restatement of Contracts. The Restatement states that the difference between
the value of the promised performance and the cost of the plaintiff's own performance, if
the latter is the lesser sum, "is a profit to which the plaintiff practically always has a right
as part of the damages." 197 Minn. at 633, 268 N.W. at 637 (quoting RESTATEMENT OF
CONTRACTS § 329 comment (b) (1932)).
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seller in the same position as full performance would have done.26 Un-
like courts awarding lost profits under the Uniform Sales Act, the WZ"-
Ihelm Lubrication Co. court did not base its rejection of the contract-market
remedy on the narrow grounds of special circumstances or the absence of
an available market. 2 7 The broad grounds used by the Minnesota
Supreme Court indicate the court's intention to award lost profits when-
ever necessary to justly compensate an injured seller.28 This intention is
also the basis for recovery of lost profits under 2-708(2).29
III. RECOVERY UNDER SECTION 2-708(2)
Article 2 of the U.C.C. provides four different remedies for an ag-
grieved seller of goods. Section 2-706 allows a seller to recover the differ-
ence between the contract price of the goods and their resale price
(contract-resale damages).30 Section 2-708(1) provides that the seller
may recover the difference between the contract price and the market
price at the time and place of tender (contract-market damages). 3' The
seller may recover the full contract price under 2-709.32 Finally, under 2-
26. 197 Minn. at 633, 268 N.W. at 637. The court stated:
Usually the measure is the difference between the contract price and the market
price if that measure will fulfill the desideratum, or, if not, the difference be-
tween the contract price and the cost of the goods to the seller. Which of the
measures or methods to employ in a particular case depends upon which accom-
plishes the desired purpose.
Id (citations omitted),
27. Id Under section 64 of the Uniform Sales Act, where there was an available
market and no special circumstances, the seller in an action for non-acceptance of goods
recovered the difference between the contract price and the market price of the goods.
The Minnesota Supreme Court awarded lost profits based on the existing market for the
goods in Love'ofy, 155 Minn. 241, 193 N.W. 173, and Baessellt 122 Minn. 335, 142 N.W.
322.
28. Note, supra note 6, at 729.
29. U.C.C. § 2-708(2) provides:
If the measure of damages provided in subsection (1) is inadequate to put the
seller in as good a position as performance would have done then the measure of
damages is the profit (including reasonable overhead) which the seller would
have made from full performance by the buyer, together with any incidental
damages provided in this Article (Section 2-710), due allowance for costs reason-
ably incurred and due credit for payments or proceeds of resale.
Id
30. U.C.C. § 2-706(1) provides that where "the resale [of the contract goods] is made
in good faith and in a commercially reasonable manner the seller may recover the differ-
ence between the resale price and the contract price ....... Id
31. U.C.C. § 2-708(1) provides that "the measure of damages for non-acceptance or
repudiation by the buyer is the difference between the market price at the time and place
for tender and the unpaid contract price .... ." Id.
32. U.C.C. § 2-709 provides that the seller may recover the price:
(a) of goods accepted or of conforming goods lost or damaged within a commer-
cially reasonable time after risk of their loss has passed to the buyer; and
(b) of goods identified to the contract if the seller is unable after reasonable
effort to resell them at a reasonable price or the circumstances reasonably
indicate that such effort will be unavailing.
[Vol. I11
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708(2) the seller may recover the profit he would have made from per-
formance (lost profit damages).
33
In Minnesota there are three prerequisites to recovering lost profits
under 2-708(2).34 The seller must prove (1) the amount of damages with
reasonable certainty;35 (2) that the buyer's wrongful acts caused the loss
of profits; and (3) that the profits were reasonably within the contempla-
tion of the parties when the contract was entered into.36 "Once the fact
of loss has been shown, the difficulty in proving its amount will not pre-
clude recovery so long as there is proof of a reasonable basis upon which
to approximate the amount." 3 7 Courts traditionally consider approxi-
mate losses based on average costs or other rough estimates sufficient to
establish a prima facie case for lost profits. 38 Because the difficulty of
proof is due to the buyer's breach, the U.C.C. requires only that lost
profits be proven to the degree of certainty which the facts permit. 39
A. Liberal Administration of Remedies
The general remedy theory of the U.C.C. is that remedies "shall be
Id.
33. For the full text of U.C.C. § 2-708(2), see supra note 29.
34. MINN. STAT. § 336.2-708(2) (verbatim adoption of U.C.C. § 2-708(2)).
35. Cardinal Consulting Co. v. Circo Resorts, Inc., 297 N.W.2d 260, 267-68 (Minn.
1980) (lost profit damages of an unestablished business are recoverable upon proof with
reasonable certainty); see also DUNN, supra note 16, § 4.2.
In Unique Sys., Inc. v. Zotos Int'l, Inc., 622 F.2d 378 (8th Cir. 1980), the court stated
that the burden of proving "lost profits is particularly heavy in the case of a new business."
Id. at 378. The general rule in Minnesota is that the lost profits of a new business are too
speculative to be a basis for recovery. Id. (quoting Village of Elbow Lake v. Ottertail
Power Co., 281 Minn. 43, 46, 160 N.W.2d 571, 574 (1968)). If there is a reasonable basis
upon which to determine the amount of lost profits, however, it is clear that a new busi-
ness can recover lost profits under Minnesota law. Id.,- see also Leoni v. Bemis Co., 255
N.W.2d 824, 826 (Minn. 1977).
36. Unique Sys., Inc., 622 F.2d at 378. Although Minnesota requires the seller to prove
that the profits lost were within the party's contemplation, it is appropriate in a commer-
cial transaction to assume that the nature of the transaction puts the breaching party on
notice that lost profit damages may be suffered. DUNN, supra note 16, § 1.10.
In Unique Sys., Inc., the court, applying Minnesota law, awarded lost profits because
the absence of a market price for the goods precluded application of the contract-market
remedy. 622 F.2d at 378. For a discussion of lost profit recovery due to lack of a market
price, see supra notes 91-105.
37. Unique Sys., Inc., 622 F.2d at 379; see also Leoni, 255 N.W.2d at 826. In Penn-
sylvania, the seller must also prove that the contract-market formula of 2-708(1) is inade-
quate. In re Bacon's Estate, 18 Buck's Co. L.R. 39, 45 Pa. D. & C. 2d 733 (1968).
Under the Uniform Sales Act the seller was required to prove that he could not miti-
gate damages by using the capacity released by the breach. Goetz & Scott, Measuring
Sellers' Damages: The Lost-Profits Puzzle, 31 STAN. L. REV. 323, 366 n.105 (1979).
38. See Unique Sys., Inc., 622 F.2d at 378-79; Leont, 255 N.W.2d at 826; Goetz & Scott,
supra note 37, at 367.
39. See Bead Chain Mfg. Co. v. Saxton Prods., Inc., 183 Conn. at 278-79, 439 A.2d at
320; infra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
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liberally administered to the end that the aggrieved party may be put in
as good a position as if the other party had fully performed."40 The
U.C.C. rejects "any doctrine that damages must be calculable with
mathematical accuracy"41 and allows courts to liberally construe the lan-
guage of the remedies sections. This policy of the U.C.C. is particularly
important to sellers attempting to recover lost profits.
The rejection of the doctrine that damages be proven with mathemati-
cal certainty allows components sellers42 and jobber sellers43 to recover
the lost profit damages they deserve. To prove lost profit damages a
seller must prove, among other things, the cost of producing or acquiring
the contract goods. 44 Proving production or acquisition costs, however,
presents problems for components sellers and jobber sellers who, due to
the buyer's breach, never produced 45 or acquired 46 the contract goods.
These sellers can only predict what their production or acquisition costs
would have been absent the breach. Few components sellers or jobber
sellers would qualify for lost profit damages if they were required to
prove projected costs with mathematical certainty.47
Lost volume sellers48 would also be denied lost profit recovery were it
not for the liberal administration of remedies provided for by the
U.C.C.49 Section 2-708(2) requires that the seller's recovery be reduced
40. U.C.C. § 1-106. This remedy theory is practically identical to general contract
remedy theory. See supra note 1.
41. U.C.C. § 1-106 comment 1. The comment also states that "[c]ompensatory dam-
ages are often at best approximate: they have to be proved with whatever definiteness and
accuracy the facts permit, but no more." Id In Minnesota, lost profit damages must be
proven with reasonable certainty. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
42. A components seller assembles or manufactures goods for a buyer. See infra notes
75-113 and accompanying text.
43. A jobber seller buys goods from a manufacturer or another wholesaler and sells
them at a higher price. See infra note 146 and accompanying text.
44. The gross profit produced by a sales contract is calculated by reducing the con-
tract price by the direct cost of manufacturing or acquiring the contract goods. See infta
notes 57-58 and accompanying text; see also Baesset, 122 Minn. at 340, 142 N.W. at 324
(where goods are to be manufactured and the buyer breaches before completion, the
measure of damages is the difference between the contract price and the cost to the seller
of completing the contract).
45. See infta note 76 and accompanying text.
46. See in fa note 148 and accompanying text.
47. Fortunately for components sellers and jobber sellers, once the fact of the loss is
proven, difficulty in proving its amount will not bar recovery if the seller can present a
reasonable basis upon which the loss may be approximated. See Unique Sys., Inc., 622 F.2d
at 378 (a new business can recover lost profits under Minnesota law if a reasonable basis
exists upon which to figure the amount); Leont, 255 N.W.2d at 826 ("Once the fact of loss
has been shown, the difficulty of proving its amount will not preclude recovery so long as
there is proof of a reasonable basis upon which to approximate the amount.").
48. A lost volume seller is a seller with a practically unlimited supply of goods which
he uses to supply a limited number of buyers. See infra notes 114-15 and accompanying
text.
49. See injfa notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
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by the proceeds received from resale of the contract goods.5o Neverthe-
less, because the U.C.C. permits liberal construction of its remedies sec-
tions to provide just compensation,5t courts are able to ignore the "due
credit for proceeds of resale" clause when awarding lost profits to lost
volume sellers.52
B. Calculation of Lost Profits
Under 2-708(2), the aggrieved seller may recover the "profit (including
reasonable overhead) which [he] would have made from full perform-
ance together with . . . due allowance for costs reasonably incurred
.. ."53 This recovery is reduced by any payments made by the buyer
and any proceeds the seller receives from reselling the goods.54 The valu-
ation of the amount by which the award will be reduced poses few
problems for courts calculating damages.55 Most damage valuation
problems involve the calculation of profits, reasonable overhead, and
costs reasonably incurred.
56
The most important element of the seller's recovery under 2-708(2) is
lost profits. "Profits" is a general term which may refer to either gross
profits or net profits. Gross profit is calculated by subtracting the cost of
goods sold from sales revenue. 57 In sales contract terms, gross profits is
the contract price reduced by the direct cost of producing or acquiring
the contract goods. 58 Direct manufacturing costs, often referred to as
variable costs, 59 include such expenses as material costs and direct labor
costs. Net profits are determined by subtracting indirect costs, or over-
50. See supra note 29 (text of U.C.C. § 2-708(2)). Since the lost volume seller requires
lost profit recovery to be placed in the same position as full performance by the buyer
would have, reduction of the lost profit recovery by the proceeds of resale would eliminate
2-708(2) as an adequate remedy formula. See 'nfta notes 122-25 and accompanying text.
51. See U.C.C. § 1-106.
52. Courts have relied primarily on 2-708(2)'s legislative history to support their lib-
eral construction. See infla notes 137-39 and accompanying text.
53. U.C.C. § 2-708(2).
54. Id
55. The dollar value of amounts received as payment or resale proceeds are easily
ascertainable in most cases. If the seller is a lost volume seller, the resale proceeds are not
deducted from the seller's damages. See infra notes 137-39 and accompanying text.
56. SeeJ. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 7-13, at 284-88.
57. A seller's gross profits are measured by subtracting the cost of goods sold from the
revenues received. P. WALGENBACH, N. DITTRICH & E. HANSON, FINANCIAL ACCOUNT-
ING, AN INTRODUCTION 129 (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as WALGENBACH].
58. See, e.g., Hodes v. Hoffman Int'l Corp., 280 F. Supp. 252, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1968);
Stuart Kitchens, Inc. v. Stevens, 248 Md. 71, 74, 234 A.2d 749, 751 (1967); Jericho Sash &
Door Co. v. Building Erectors, Inc., 362 Mass. 871, 872, 286 N.E.2d 343, 344 (1972); Jes-
sup & Moore Paper Co. v. Bryant Paper Co., 297 Pa. 483, 488-89, 147 A. 519, 522 (1929);
Coast Trading Co. v. Parmac, Inc., 21 Wash. App. 896, 909-11, 587 P.2d 1071, 1079
(1978).
59. Direct and variable costs generally go directly to the production of goods and
therefore vary with the level of production. These costs are "incurred in reliance on the
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head, from gross profits.60
The Code does not specify whether "profits (including reasonable
overhead)" under 2-708(2) means gross profit or net profit. All reported
cases are in agreement, however, that "profits (including reasonable
overhead)" is the equivalent of net profits plus overhead 6 1 or gross profits
including overhead. 6 2
Overhead is defined as "those relatively stable expenses which are es-
sential to performance and which continue even if the performance of a
specific contract is temporarily halted."63 Examples of overhead ex-
penses include property taxes and managerial and clerical salaries.
These expenses are distinguished from variable expenses, such as mate-
rial and labor costs, which are "incurred in reliance on the contract,
which may be identified to a specific contract and which, if the contract
is not performed, could be avoided." 64 Under 2-708(2) reasonable over-
head is included in lost profit recovery. 65
Common law courts were less willing to award overhead costs.66
contract . . . identified to a specific contract and . . . if the contract [is] not performed,
could be avoided." Neumiller Farms, Inc. v. Cornett, 368 So. 2d 272, 277 (Ala. 1979).
The terms direct cost and variable cost can be used interchangeably in most situa-
tions. In certain situations, however, variable costs may be indirect costs. For example,
administrative salaries are usually considered to be indirect fixed costs because they are
not identified to any specific goods and are not normally affected by the breach of a single
sales contract. If the breached sales contract supplies a very large percentage of the com-
pany's business, the breach may result in a reduction in the company's administrative
work force. In such a situation, administrative costs are considered variable in relation to
the breached contract. See R & I Elec., Inc. v. Neuman, 66 A.D.2d 836, 838, 411 N.Y.S.2d
401, 404-05 (1978); DUNN, supra note 16, § 6.5.
60. WALGENBACH, supra note 49, at 129.
61. See, e.g., Vitex Mfg. Corp. v. Caribtex Corp., 377 F.2d 795 (3d Cir. 1967);Jessup &
Moore, 297 Pa. 483, 147 A. 519; see also DUNN, supra note 16, § 6.5.
62. See, e.g., Unique Sys., Inc., 622 F.2d at 379 (applying Minnesota law); Neumiller
Farms, Inc., 368 So. 2d at 276-77; Bead Chain Mfg. Co., 183 Conn. at 277, 439 A.2d at 320; see
also DUNN, supra note 16, § 6.5.
63. Neumi/er Farms, Inc., 368 So. 2d at 277; see also G. SCHILLINGLAW, COST Ac-
COUNTING: ANALYSIS AND CONTROL 373 (rev. ed. 1967). Examples of overhead expenses
are executive and clerical salaries, property taxes, and general and administrative ex-
penses. Vitex Mfg. Corp., 377 F.2d at 798.
64. Neumiller Farms, Inc., 368 So. 2d at 277. According to the Neumiller court, variable
costs are costs which are directly incurred to produce the contract goods. Id
65. There is no authoritative application of the reasonability limitation on overhead
recovery. One commentator suggests that the limitation is designed to allow the seller
recovery for any items which can reasonably be classified as overhead, rather than to limit
overhead recovery to a reasonable amount. R. NORDSTROM, LAW OF SALES § 177 (1970).
66. The courts were divided on how to treat overhead. Some held that overhead was
a cost saved by the breach. These courts deducted overhead from the contract price when
calculating lost profits. See, e.g., Willhe/m Lubricaton Co., 197 Minn. at 632-34, 268 N.W. at
636-37; Worrell & Williams v. Kinnear Mfg. Co., 103 Va. 719, 723-24, 49 S.E. 988, 989-91
(1905). Other courts held that overhead is a fixed cost not saved by the breach. Over-
head, therefore, was not deducted from the contract price and was recovered as gross
profit. See, e.g.,Jessup &Moore, 297 Pa. 483, 147 A. 519.
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Under the common law, a seller attempting to recover overhead expenses
had to prove that the time and capacity saved by not having to perform
the contract was not used to generate new profits. 6 7 If the seller failed to
meet this burden, the court reduced the award by the amount of fixed
and overhead costs allocated to the released capacity. These cases have
subsequently been criticized as improperly including overhead as a cost
saved by the breach. 68
Recovery under 2-708(2) includes overhead allocated to the breached
contract because without such recovery a seller is not placed in the same
position as full performance.69 To recover overhead costs during a busi-
ness year a seller must allocate them to the goods sold. When a contract
is breached and the seller's sales volume is reduced, the seller has fewer
goods to which overhead costs can be allocated. If the overhead costs
allocated to the contract goods are not recovered as damages, those costs
must be allocated to his remaining contracts. The profitability of those
contracts is thereby reduced 70 and the seller is left in a position worse
than if the contract had been performed.
71
67. Goetz & Scott, supra note 37, at 368.
68. Id.
69. Recovery of overhead is more of a problem for sellers recovering under 2-708(2)
than for sellers recovering under other U.C.C. seller's remedies. If a seller recovers con-
tract-market damages (2-708(1)), or contract-resale damages (2-706), or recovers the con-
tract price (2-709), total costs incurred will be reimbursed. The seller is then not forced to
reallocate the overhead to other goods. Speidel & Clay, supra note 1, at 711 & n.87.
Allocation of overhead to particular goods is necessary to recover these costs. Al-
though allocation is often arbitrary and dependent on relative volume, accuracy may be
increased by using predetermined overhead rates derived from cost averages during peri-
ods of normal production. Speidel & Clay, supra note 1, at 689 n.31; see also SCHILLIN-
CLAW, supra note 63, at 82-83, 207-22, 687-89; cf Vitex Mfg. Corp., 377 F.2d at 799 (pro-rata
allocation of overhead costs is an analytical construct not normally directly related to any
individual transaction).
70. Since the profit produced by a sales contract is the difference between the con-
tract price and total costs, any increase in total costs decreases the profit. See Speidel &
Clay, supra note 1, at 692. The aggrieved seller is entitled to receive gains prevented by the
breach. See Vitex Mfg. Corp., 377 F.2d at 798.
71. Speidel & Clay, supra note 1, at 692; J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 7-
13, at 286.
Speidel and Clay argue that not all sellers should recover overhead costs. They di-
vide a seller's activities into three production stages based upon the relationship between
average variable costs per unit and average fixed costs per unit. A seller enters production
stage III when average variable costs per unit begin to increase faster than average fixed
costs per unit are decreasing. According to Speidel and Clay, stage III is the most rational
operating stage for a seller attempting to recover his costs and earn a profit. Speidel &
Clay, supra note 1, at 697.
Speidel and Clay's thesis is that, "if a seller is in stage III, the allowance of overhead
as damages will put him in a better overall position than if the buyer had fully per-
formed." Id For a stage III seller, "the savings realized from not having to incur [in-
creased] variable costs equal or exceed the loss from being unable to spread fixed costs
over one more unit of production." Id at 711.
Speidel and Clay admit that their interpretation of the reasonable overhead clause of
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In addition to profit, the seller can recover the costs reasonably in-
curred towards performance of the contract. 72 These costs are the varia-
ble costs reasonably expended towards performance of the contract. 73 If
costs could have been avoided through diligence and reasonable efforts,
they will be deemed unreasonably incurred costs which the seller may
not recover.
74
IV. THE COMPONENTS SELLER
A components seller is a seller who agrees to assemble or manufacture
contract goods for a buyer.75 If the buyer breaches the contract before
the goods are finished and the components seller reasonably elects not to
complete production, courts and commentators generally agree that the
seller is entitled to recover lost profits under 2-708(2).76 This is a depar-
ture, however, from the common law and the Uniform Sales Act.
Common law courts generally awarded lost profits only to sellers of
specially ordered goods.77 If there was a ready market for the goods the
seller was limited to recovery of the contract price-market price differen-
tial.78 In addition, under the Uniform Sales Act it was required that the
seller have access to a ready market. 79 A seller electing not to complete
performance could recover lost profits under Uniform Sales Act section
64(4)80 by showing that he could not make substitute contracts on the
2-708(2) presents new problems of proof for the seller. Id at 712. They also admit that
their economic cost theory may increase the cost and difficulty of proving losses to the
point of making their theory impractical in application. Id at 713.
72. See supra note 29 (text of U.C.C. § 2-708(2)).
73. Vee Nobs Chem., U.S.A., Inc. v. Koppers Co., 616 F.2d 212, 216 (5th Cir. 1980).
74. See Neumiller Farms, Inc., 368 So. 2d at 277. This is consistent with the mitigation
of damages principle of general contract law. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
75. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 7-10.
76. See, e.g., Unique Sys., Inc., 622 F.2d 373; Nobs Chem., 616 F.2d 213; A'eumiller Farms,
Inc., 368 So. 2d 272; Bead Chain Mfg. Co., 183 Conn. 266, 439 A.2d 314; Cesco Mfg. Corp. v.
Norcross, Inc., 7 Mass. App. 837, 391 N.E.2d 270 (1979); Timber Access Indus. Co. v. U.S.
Plywood-Champion Papers, Inc., 263 Or. 509, 503 P.2d 482 (1972); Detroit Power Screw-
driver, 25 Mich. App. 478, 181 N.W.2d 828; Chicago Roller Skate Mfg. Co. v. Sokol Mfg.
Co., 185 Neb. 515, 177 N.W.2d 25 (1970); J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 7-13.
But see Goetz & Scott, supra note 37; Peters, Remedies For Breach of Contracts Relating to the Sale
of Goods Under the Uniform Commercial Code: A Roadmap For Article Two, 73 YALE L.J. 199
(1963).
77. Goetz & Scott, supra note 37, at 328 n.15; see, e.g., Schloss v. Josephs, 98 Minn.
442, 108 N.W. 474 (1906).
78. Goetz & Scott, supra note 37, at 323-24.
79. Id at 324; seeJessup & Moore, 297 Pa. 483, 147 A. 519 (if a fixed market price
exists, the measure of damages is the difference between that sum and the contract price
or, if the goods were specially prepared for the buyer, the loss is the difference between the
resale price and the contract price).
80. Uniform Sales Act § 64 is the seller's remedy section of the Uniform Sales Act for
non-acceptance. Goetz & Scott, supra note 37, at 328 n.15.
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Legislative history indicates that 2-708(2) was intended to apply in
cases where a components seller reasonably ceases manufacture after
learning of the breach.8 2 In its 1949 draft form, 2-708 did not indicate
whether it was intended to supply a remedy for the components seller.83
In the 1954 revision, language was added to the section, unaccompanied
by official explanation, which was designed to incorporate an appropri-
ate measurement for salvage cases:8 4 "due allowance for costs reasonably
incurred and due credit for payments or proceeds of resale."85 According to
the drafters, this clause was added to clarify the right of the seller to
realize junk value when it is manifestly useless to complete the operation
of manufacture.86 Section 2-708(2) is tailored to fit the components seller
who has reasonably ceased manufacture and attempts to salvage the con-
tract materials he has on hand.
The crucial question for lost profit recovery is whether the components
seller's decision not to complete the goods was reasonable. 8 7 The seller
"in the exercise of reasonable commercial judgment" and "for the pur-
poses of avoiding loss and of effective realization" may under 2-704
either "complete the manufacture . . . or cease manufacture and resell
[the goods] for scrap or salvage value . "88 Completion makes the
goods available for resale under 2-706, the seller's primary remedy, or if
resale is impracticable, allows the seller to bring an action under 2-709
for the contract price. Once the components seller completes the goods
after the breach, his status as a components seller is no longer relevant to
the determination of which remedies are available to him. He is then in
the same position as any other seller who is left in possession of com-
pleted goods after the breach.
One commentator interprets 2-704 in language resembling the com-
mon law mitigation of damages doctrine.89 According to Professor Har-
81. SeeJessup & Moore, 297 Pa. at 490, 147 A. at 522; Goetz & Scott, supra note 37, at
328 n.15.
82. Cesco Mfg. Corp., 7 Mass. App. Ct. at 843, 391 N.E.2d at 274; 1954 AMENDMENTS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE ENLARGED EDITORIAL BOARD TO § 2-708 14 (1954); J.
WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 7-10. See generally Peters, supra note 76, at 273 (2-
708(2) is one of the only provisions remotely applicable).
83. The 1949 draft of section 2-708 is identical to its present form except that it did
not include the present section's final clause. Goetz & Scott, supra note 37, at 328 n.15. See
supra note 29 for the complete text of 2-708(2).
84. Goetz & Scott, supra note 37, at 328 n.15.
85. U.C.C. § 2-708(2) (emphasis added).
86. Goetz & Scott, supra note 37, at 328 n. 15 (citing UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE:
AMENDMENTS APPROVED BY ACTION OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE AND THE NA-
TIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM LAWS 14 (1954)).
87. See generally I SQUILLANTE & FONSECA, THE LAW OF MODERN COMMERCIAL
PRACTICES § 3:101, at 387 (rev. ed. 1980).
88. U.C.C. § 2-704(2).
89. Harris, 4 Radical Restatement of the Law of Seller's Damages." Sales Act and Commercial
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ris, a seller's decision not to complete the goods should be deemed
reasonable unless the seller knew or should have known that this decision
would enhance his damages and a decision to complete would not unrea-
sonably impair or harm his other interests.90
The most important criterion for determining whether the compo-
nents seller's decision not to complete the goods was reasonable is the
availability of a resale market for the goods. The absence of a resale
market makes the measures in 2-706 and 2-708(1) inapplicable. The con-
tract-resale measure in 2-70691 cannot apply when the seller cannot resell
the goods. 92 The absence of a resale market also precludes application of
the contract-market formula of 2-708(l).93 Moreover, in most situations,
a commercially reasonable seller would not incur the expenses necessary
to complete performance94 only to bring an action for the full contract
price under 2-709.95 Therefore, if the seller fails to find an available mar-
ket in which to mitigate his damages, he may recover lost profits under 2-
708(2).
Cases which present the least difficulty to courts evaluating compo-
nents sellers' damage claims are those involving specially manufactured
Code Results Compared, 18 STAN. L. REV. 66, 72 (1965); see also RESTATEMENT OF CON-
TRACTS § 336 (1932). The Restatement provides that "[d]amages are not recoverable for
harm that the plaintiff should have foreseen and could have avoided by reasonable effort
without undue risk, expense, or humiliation." Id § 336(1).
90. Harris, supra note 89, at 72. It is generally agreed that a seller has a duty to
mitigate his damages. See Speidel & Clay, supra note 1, at 685.
91. See supra note 30 (quoting U.C.C. § 2-706(1)).
92. Section 2-706 provides that the seller may recover the difference between the re-
sale price and the contract price, together with incidental damages but less expenses.
U.C.C. § 2-706. If the seller cannot resell the contract goods following the breach, no
resale price can be established. Absence of a resale price precludes application of the
contract-resale damage formula.
93. Section 2-708(1) provides that "the measure of damages for non-acceptance or
repudiation by the buyer is the difference between the market price at the time and place
for tender and the unpaid contract price. U.C.C. § 2-708(1). Without a market
price this formula cannot be applied.
94. Under 2-704, "an aggrieved seller may in the exercise of reasonable commercial
judgment for the purposes of avoiding loss and of effective realization either complete the
manufacture and wholly identify the goods to the contract or cease manufacture and resell
[the goods] for scrap or salvage value." U.C.C. § 2-704. SeegeneralyJ. WHITE & R. SUM-
MERS, supra note 2, § 7-14 (discussion of U.C.C. § 2-704).
95. See supra note 32 (text of U.C.C. § 2-709).
Normally the buyer should not be liable for expenses the seller incurs toward comple-
tion after being informed of the breach. In certain circumstances, however, the seller may
make a commercially reasonable decision to complete the contract goods and then find
that no market exists by the time the goods are completed. Because the seller's decision
was reasonable at the time, the seller should recover the full contract price. However, "[i]t
will take a persuasive lawyer to convince a court that it should not measure the 2-704
decision by hindsight when the plaintiff, having completed, finds himself unable to resell."
J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 7-5, at 263 (footnote omitted).
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goods.96 When the goods are specially manufactured, the absence of a
resale market induces a salvage decision under 2-704(2).97 Courts uni-
formly agree that 2-708(2) is the only appropriate measure of damages in
this situation.98 The breaching buyer is the only market for a seller of
specially manufactured goods. As the Connecticut Supreme Court
stated in Bead Chain Manufacturing Co. v. Saxton Products, Inc.,99 "a seller of
uncompleted components whose market is composed solely of the buyer
in breach cannot adequately measure his damages in any other way."00
Lost profit recovery due to the lack of a market is not limited to those
situations where the lack of a market is attributable to the uniqueness of
the goods. For example, in Unique Systems, Inc. v. Zotos International, Inc.,I
the seller contracted to develop and manufacture a commercial hair-
spray system for a buyer.tO2 The buyer repudiated the contract before
placing any orders.103 The court found that there was no market price
because the buyer's anticipatory breach prevented the seller from pro-
ducing the system in marketable quantities. I0 4 The contract-market
measure of damages was therefore inadequate and the seller was
awarded lost profits.105
The mere existence of a market does not determine the applicability of
2-708(2) to a components seller. The market must be one which, if
96. Specially manufactured goods are goods produced to the buyer's specifications
and for which there exists no market but the buyer in breach. See, e.g., Neumiler Farms,
Inc., 368 So. 2d at 275-76 (some market for chipping potatoes existed but seller had no
obligation to give priority to selling those potatoes allocated to buyer's contract); Bead
Chain Mfg. Co., 183 Conn. at 278-79, 439 A.2d at 320 (specially manufactured electronic
parts); Industrial Circuits Co. v. Terminal Communications, Inc., 26 N.C. App. 536, 537,
216 S.E.2d 919, 920 (1975) (printed circuit boards). See generally Childress & Burgess,
Seller's Remedies: The Prmacy of UC.C § 2-708(2), 48 N.Y.U. L. REV. 833,876-77 (1983); J.
WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 7-5.
97. Goetz & Scott, supra note 37, at 358. When no resale market for the goods exists,
it is not commercially reasonable for the seller to complete manufacture. See supra notes
89-93 and accompanying text.
98. See, e.g., Anchorage Centennial Dev. Co. v. Van Wormer & Rodrigues, Inc., 443
P.2d 596, 599 (Alaska 1968); Bead Chain Mfg. Co., 183 Conn. at 278-79, 439 A.2d at 320;
Detroit Power Screwdriver, 25 Mich. at 486-88, 181 N.W.2d at 832-33; Chicago Roller Skate
Mfg. Co., 185 Neb. at 517-18, 177 N.W.2d at 27.
99. 183 Conn. 266, 439 A.2d 314.
100. Id. at 278-79, 439 A.2d at 320; see also Neumiler Farms, Inc., 368 So. 2d at 276;
Detroit Power Screwdriver Co., 25 Mich. at 480, 181 N.W.2d at 833 (formula basing damages
on the difference between market price and contract price is without meaning in the con-
text of a contract for a specialty item which has no market); J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS,
supra note 2, § 7-10.
101. 622 F.2d 373.
102. Id. at 375.
103. Id at 376.
104. Id. at 378 (applying MINN. STAT. § 336.2-708).
105. Id at 379.
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availed of, would substantially mitigate the seller's damages.106 For ex-
ample, in Cesco Manufacturing Corp. v. Norcross, Inc.,10 7 the seller was left
with an odd number of completed and partially completed goods after
the breach. 108 The Cesco court concluded that the seller's line of business
materially differed from that which would be involved in the sale of an
odd quantity of goods.1 09 The court held that despite the existence of a
market for the goods, "if the price was insufficient to justify the costs of
finding [the market], the plaintiff could not be expected to do so." 110
Some commentators are less convinced than the courts that 2-708(2)
applies to the components seller. One commentator believes that the
components seller's lost profits are too speculative' 1I and that the 2-
708(2) formula lacks guidelines for situations where the seller would have
lost money had the contract been fulfilled.'12 Two other commentators
contend that, like the common law rule, an exception to the contract-
market formula in 2-708(1) should be made only for the seller of specially
ordered goods where there is no available market. 13
V. THE LOST VOLUME SELLER
Another seller entitled to recovery of lost profits under 2-708(2) is the
lost volume seller' 14 A lost volume seller is a seller with a practically
unlimited supply of goods to supply a limited number of buyers. The
lost volume seller expects to make a profit from the sale of goods to each
available buyer. When a buyer breaches, the seller's resale of the con-
tract goods to a buyer who would have bought goods anyway does not
reduce the damages the seller suffers. But for the buyer's breach, the
seller would have received a profit from both the breaching buyer and
106. Timber Access Indus. Co., 263 Or. at 525, 503 P.2d at 490; see also Cesco Mfg. Corp., 7
Mass. App. 837, 391 N.E.2d 270.
107. 7 Mass. App. 837, 391 N.E.2d 270.
108. Id at 839, 391 N.E.2d at 272.
109. Id.; see also Timber Access Indus. Co., 263 Or. 509, 503 P.2d 482. In Timber Access
Indus. Co., the Oregon Supreme Court recognized the existence of a market for the goods if
the goods had been completed. The court awarded lost profit damages, stating that "if
the price was insufficient to justify the plaintiffs costs of producing the [goods], plaintiff
could not have been expected to produce and sell them, nor would plaintiff's damages
have been mitigated by its so doing." Id at 525, 503 P.2d at 490.
110. 7 Mass. App. at 843, 391 N.E.2d at 274-75.
111. Peters, supra note 76, at 274. Peters states that only one element of the lost profits
equation, salvage value, will be based on statistics while the other two elements, cost of
completion and expected profit, must of necessity be speculative. Id at 274 n.202. Peters'
argument conflicts with the general remedy theory of the U.C.C., which rejects "any doc-
trine that damages must be calculable with mathematical accuracy." U.C.C. § 1-106
comment 1.
112. Peters, supra note 76, at 274.
113. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 37, at 358.








The lost volume principle is illustrated in the following example. An
automobile dealer, S, agrees to sell a car to B for $10,000. B repudiates
the contract and S sells the car to Cone week later for $10,000. B claims
that he owes S nothing because S received from C the full $10,000
purchase price for the car. But for the breach, however, S would have
sold cars to both B and C and would have had the profit from two sales
instead of one.
A seller must satisfy three criteria to be classified as a lost volume
seller.116 First, the seller must prove that the person who bought the
resold goods would have been solicited by the seller to buy other similar
goods
had there been no breach. To satisfy this criterion, the seller must
prove that he would have solicited another buyer' 17 and that the partic-
ular resale buyer would have been solicited. 118 Second, the seller must
prove that the solicitation of the resale buyer would have been success-
ful.' 19 This criterion generally poses few problems for the seller if the
resale was successful. Finally, the seller must prove his ability to have
performed the contract if the breaching buyer had not breached.12o
115. In Snyder v. Herbert Greenbaum & Assocs., 38 Md. App. 144, 380 A.2d 618
(1977) the appellee-seller contracted to sell carpet to the appellant-buyer. After the buyer
wrongfully cancelled the contract, the seller resold the carpet. According to the court:
Appellee's original expectation, then, would have been to make a profit from the
sale of carpet to appellants, and, even if appellants did not breach, to make a
profit on the sale of additional carpet to the buyers who, because of appellants'
breach, became the resale purchasers. As a result of appellants' breach, the ap-
pellee would have lost one of these expected sales, and thereby was damaged to
the extent of the profit he lost on that sale.
Id at 154, 380 A.2d at 624.
The inadequacy of the contract-market formula and the necessity of awarding lost
profits in certain situations was recognized under the Uniform Sales Act, particularly in
the case of automobile dealers. See supra note 6. The lost volume argument for lost profit
recovery was well stated by a Canadian court in Mason & Risch Ltd. v. Christner, 47 Ont.
L.R. 52 (1920):
Where the article sold is a machine or a piano, there is no such thing as an open
market ready to absorb all that is cast upon it, but only a limited number of
purchasers exist . . . . When [a sales] contract is broken, it is no answer to say
'you can sell your piano at the same price, and so have suffered no damage.' If
the contract had not been broken, a second piano would have been sold and the
dealer would have had the profit on two sales instead of one.
Id at 54.
116. Harris, supra note 89, at 82.
117. Unless the seller is a commercial seller, he probably would not have solicited an-
other buyer. A commercial seller who planned to go out of business before the breach
occurred, or who had reached the limits of its planned production, also probably would
not have solicited another seller. Id
118. If the resale buyer was solicited as a result of the breach, this criteria is not satis-
fied. Id
119. Id
120. Id; see also Famous Knitwear Corp. v. Drug Fair, Inc., 493 F.2d 251, 254-55 (4th
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The lost volume seller must look to the 2-708(2) measure of damages to
be placed in the same position as the buyer's full performance would
have placed him.121 The lost volume seller will not, however, recover the
profits he lost if 2-708(2) is literally applied. Section 2-708(2) provides
that the breaching buyer must be given "due credit for. . . proceeds of
resale."122 This means that the value which the seller receives from re-
sale of the contract goods must be deducted from the lost profits the
seller is entitled to recover. As a practical matter, if the due credit clause
is applied to the lost volume seller, the measure of damages is equivalent
to those in 2-708(1) and 2-706, assuming the goods are sold at approxi-
mately their market price.123 Strictly applied, 2-708(2) awards the lost
volume seller his lost profits and the cost of acquiring or producing the
goods 124 minus, under the "due credit" clause, the resale proceeds. The
lost volume seller is then left with the difference, if any, between the
profit he would have earned on the original contract and the profit re-
ceived from the resale contract.
2 5
The history of 2-708(2) indicates that this is not the result intended by
the drafters. The first draft of 2-708(2)126 did not include the due credit
clause.127 The section simply stated that if the contract-market measure
Cir. 1974); Snydr, 38 Md. App. at 157, 380 A.2d at 626; Neri v. Retail Marine Corp., 30
N.Y.2d 393, 398-99, 334 N.Y.S.2d 165, 169-70, 285 N.E.2d 311,314 (1972); J. WHITE & R.
SUMMERS, supra note 2, at 285.
121. The aim of the U.C.C. remedies is to put the aggrieved party in as good a position
as if the other party had fully performed. U.C.C. § 1-106(1). See supra notes 40-41 and
accompanying text.
122. See supra note 29 (text of U.C.C. § 2-708(2)). The due credit clause leaves the lost
volume seller in approximately the same position as would 2-706 and 2-708(2). See infra
notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
123. See Snyder, 38 Md. App. at 155, 380 A.2d at 625.
124. Section 2-708(2) gives the seller "due allowance for costs reasonably incurred."
Since the lost volume seller is dealing with goods completed at the time of the sale, his
reasonably incurred costs are the acquisition or production costs.
125. Suppose the original contract price is $100, consisting of $80 worth of production
costs (costs reasonably incurred) and a $20 profit. If the goods are resold for $95, the seller
recovers his production costs plus a $15 profit. Strictly applied, 2-708(2) will award the
seller his lost profit ($20) plus his costs reasonably incurred ($80), minus the resale pro-
ceeds ($95). The lost volume seller will therefore recover $5. If the buyer would have
performed, the seller would have received $35 (the $20 profit from the breached sale plus
the $15 profit from the resale).
126. The first draft of 2-708(2) was made in 1944. UNIFORM REVISED SALES ACT,
PROPOSED FINAL DRAFr No. 1 § 110, at 58 (1944).
127. Section 110 of the Uniform Revi:ed Sales Act states:
Damages for Nonacceptance. The measure of damages for nonacceptance is the dif-
ference between the unpaid contract price and the price current at the time and
place for tender together with any incidental damages under Section 112 but less
any expense saved in consequence of the buyer's breach, except that if the fore-
going measure of damages is inadequate to put the seller in as good a position as
performance would have done then the measure of damages is the profit the
seller would have made from full performance by the buyer.
UNIFORM REVISED SALES AcT, Proposed Final Draft No. 1 § 110, at 58 (1944).
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is inadequate, the measure is "the profit the seller would have received
from full performance by the buyer."' 28 This section provided precisely
the measure of damages necessary to adequately compensate the lost vol-
ume seller.
The drafters added official comments in 1949 which emphasized that
lost profits are to be awarded when standard priced articles are in-
volved.129 Professors White and Summers contend that the relevant
characteristic that qualifies the seller of standard priced goods for recov-
ery of lost profits is not the "standard pricedness" of the goods.
1 3 0
Rather, it is that a fixed price seller will lose one sale when the buyer
breaches, and, even if he resells the goods to a second buyer, "he will still
not be made whole by difference-money because he will have lost one
sale, one profit, over the course of the year.'
' 3 1
In 1954, the due credit clause was added to 2-708(2).132 According to
the drafters, this clause was added to "extend the rule clearly to the right
of repudiation and to clarify the right of the seller to realize junk value
when it is manifestly useless to complete the operation of manufac-
ture."' 133 This clause effectively eliminated 2-708(2), as literally con-
strued, from being a proper measure of damages for the lost volume
seller. 134 Courts and commentators generally agree, however, that 2-
708(2) is the proper measure for a lost volume seller.135 The problem
then is determining how 2-708(2) should be construed to provide the lost
volume seller a fitting remedy. Fortunately for the lost volume seller, the
U.C.C. provides for liberal administration of remedies.
136
The courts agree that the due credit clause of 2-708(2) should be ig-
128. Id
129. The lost profit clause is explained in comment 2 to section 2-708:
The provision of this section permitting recovery of expected profit including
overhead where the standard measure of damages is inadequate, together with
the new requirement that price actions may be sustained only where resale is
impractical, are designed to eliminate the unfair and economically wasteful re-
sults arising under the older law when fixed price articles were involved. This
section permits the recovery of lost profits in all appropriate cases, which would
include all standard priced goods.
U.C.C. § 2-708 comment 2.
130. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 2, at 275.
131. Id
132. U.C.C. § 2-708(2) (1954 draft).
133. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: AMENDMENTS APPROVED BY ACTION OF THE
AMERICAN Lmv INSTITUTE AND THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON
UNIFORM LAWS 14 (1954).
134. See supra note 125.
135. See Famous Knitwear Corp., 493 F.2d at 254; Snydr, 38 Md. App. at 154-55, 380
A.2d at 624-25; en, 30 N.Y.2d at 400, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 169, 285 N.E.2d at 314. See
generally J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 2, at § 7-9; Goetz & Scott, supra note 37;
Schlosser, Construing U C C Section 2-708(2) to Apply to the Lost Volume Seller, 24 CASE W.
RES. 686 (1973). But see Shanker, The Casefor a Literal Reading of U.CC Section 2-708(2)
(One Profit/or the Reseller), 24 CASE W. RES. 697 (1973).
136. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
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nored in a lost volume situation.137 These courts rely primarily on sec-
tion 2-708(2)'s legislative history for support. The New York Court of
Appeals, for example, has held that the due credit clause is inapplicable
to the lost volume seller's retail sales contract, concluding from the
drafter's comments that the clause applies only where the goods are re-
sold as scrap.138 The Maryland Court of Special Appeals, depending on
the same comment as the New York court, concluded that the due credit
provision is apparently "intended to affect the rights of a particular class
of sellers, which class does not include the 'lost volume seller.' "139
Most commentators agree with the results reached by the courts.1 40
Professors White, Summers, and Harris agree that the courts should sim-
ply ignore the due credit language in lost volume cases. 14 1 White and
Summers state that "[g]ross errors of the kind here committed by the
drafters call for extraordinary solutions."142 Professor Schlosser offers an
alternative method under 2-708(2). He contends that the phrase "profit
• . .which the seller would have made from full performance" should be
read to comprise the profit lost from the breach and the profit on the
resale contract.1 43 The lost volume seller may then give the breaching
buyer due credit for the proceeds of resale and still retain the profit lost
from the breach. 144 The principle that the proceeds of a resale contract
137. Famous Knitwear Corp., 493 F.2d at 254; Snyder, 38 Md. App. at 155-56, 380 A.2d at
625-26; Nert, 30 N.Y.2d at 399, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 169, 285 N.E.2d at 314.
138. Nert, 30 N.Y.2d at 399 n.2, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 169 n.2, 285 N.E.2d at 314 n.2. The
comment upon which the Neri court depended states that the "due credit clause is in-
tended to refer to the privilege of the seller to realize junk value when it is manifestly
useless to complete the operation of manufacture." Id. (quoting Supp. No. I to the 1952
Office Draft of Text and Comments of the Uniform Commercial Code, as amended by the
action of the American Law Institute of the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform Laws at 14 (1954)).
139. Snyder, 38 Md. App. at 154-55, 380 A.2d at 624-25. The Snyder court also de-
pended upon its own statutory construction rule that " 'results that are unreasonable or
inconsistent with common sense should be avoided, whenever possible.' Our holding
avoids a result that is clearly 'inconsistent with common sense.'" Id at 158, 380 A.2d at
626-27 (citing Height v. State, 225 Md. 251, 259, 170 A.2d 212, 215 (1960) and Maguire v.
State, 192 Md. 615, 65 A.2d 299 (1949)).
In Famous Knitwear Corp., 493 F.2d 251, the court stated that, were the due credit
clause not omitted, the measure of damages would be substantially the same as the con-
tract-market differential of § 2-708(1). The Famous Knitwear Corp. court concluded that 2-
708(2) would thus have meaning only for the salvaging seller/manufacturer and not the
seller of standard priced goods. The court held that the official comment to section 2-
708(2) negated such purpose on the drafters' part. Id. at 254.
140. See, e.g., Goetz & Scott, supra note 37; J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 7-
13, at 285. But see Shanker, supra note 135.
141. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 7-13, at 285; Harris, supra note 89, at 99.
142. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 7-13, at 285.
143. Schlosser, supra note 135, at 692-93.
144. Id There are two significant problems with Schlosser's formula. First, the
formula requires that the contract goods be traced to a particular contract so that the
resale profit can be determined. This is impossible where the goods are fungible or where
[Vol. I1I
20
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [1985], Art. 9
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol11/iss1/9
LOST PROFITS
are not always applied to reduce the breaching buyer's liability is fol-
lowed by courts and commentators alike.1 45 The general consensus is
that 2-708(2) is an equitable and workable remedy for the lost volume
seller.
VI. THE JOBBER SELLER
A jobber buys goods from a manufacturer or from another wholesaler
and sells them at a higher price to a dealer.146 The jobber depends on
the purchase price-resale price differential to make a profit, pay his over-
head costs, and recover his expenses. 147 To be placed in the same posi-
tion as full performance, the jobber who did not acquire the contract
goods before the breach needs to recover his lost profit, overhead, and
expenses. This is precisely the remedy provided by 2-708(2).
A jobber may use the 2-708(2) measure of damages if he did not ac-
quire the contract goods and his decision not to acquire the goods was
based upon reasonable commercial judgment. 148 Using reasonable com-
mercial judgment, the seller must decide whether he can reduce his losses
by acquiring the goods, reselling them, and pursuing either the contract-
resale remedy of section 2-706 or the contract-market remedy of section
2-708(1). Acquisition and resale of the goods may enable the seller to
recoup some or all of his expenses and profit from a second buyer, thus
reducing the original buyer's liability for the breach. If reasonable com-
mercial judgment dictates that acquisition of the goods will increase the
breaching buyer's liability, the seller should refrain from acquiring the
particular goods have not been identified to the contract at the time of breach. Determi-
nation of resale profit will also be very difficult if the contract goods are resold as parts of
many different contracts. Therefore, tracing the contract goods to a resale contract may
substantially increase the seller's burden of proof.
Second, Schlosser's formula requires proof of a sales contract with a third party, the
formation and performance of which is completely independent of the breached contract.
It is purely coincidental that the breach turned one of the seller's contracts into a resale
contract. A seller seeking lost profit damages should not be burdened with proving the
existence of a contract so unrelated to the actual damage suffered.
145. See supra notes 137-44 and accompanying text.
146. In an economic sense, a jobber is an operative of the wholesaling process. His
service in the process is to relieve the manufacturer of direct contact with the dealer.
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 67 F. Supp. 397, 481 (D.D.C. 1946).
147. See Irving Tier Co. v. Griffin, 244 Cal. App. 2d 852, 868-69, 53 Cal. Rptr. 469, 480
(1966).
148. See, e.g., Blair Int'l, Ltd. v. LaBarge, Inc., 675 F.2d 954 (8th Cir. 1982); Nobs
Chem., U.S.A., Inc. v. Koppers Co., 616 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1980); Timber Access Indus.
Co. v. United States Plywood-Champion Papers, Inc., 263 Or. 509, 503 P.2d 482 (1972).
Section 2-704 states that, if the contract goods are not finished (or in the jobbers case, not
acquired) at the time of breach, the seller may, "in the exercise of reasonable commercial
judgment for the purposes of avoiding loss and of effective realization either complete...
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goods and may recover damages under 2-708(2). 149
If the jobber acquires the contract goods, his status as a jobber is not a
factor in determining which remedies are available. A jobber in posses-
sion of contract goods is in the same position as any seller in possession of
finished goods after the buyer's breach. He has the option, under the
appropriate circumstances, of pursuing any of the seller's remedies pro-
vided in the Code.15
0
According to the courts, 2-708(2) is the only remedy available to the
jobber seller who properly refrains from acquiring the contract goods.15 1
Because the seller does not have the goods, he cannot resell them. The
contract-resale measure of 2-706, the seller's primary remedy, does not
apply.152 The seller's lack of possession of the contract goods also pre-
cludes an action for price under 2-709. 53 Moreover, the contract-market
measure of 2-708(1) is inadequate where the seller has no goods with
which he can recover the market price.154
Professors Goetz and Scott argue that the contract-market formula is
the proper measure of damages for the jobber seller. 155 They define mar-
ket price as wholesale price, 156 which is the jobber seller's cost of acquisi-
tion.15 7 Under their formula, therefore, the jobber seller would recover
149. See Nobs Chem., 616 F.2d at 215. A jobber must satisfy two conditions to recover
under 2-708(2): "[f]irst, he [must be] a seller who never acquires the contract goods. Sec-
ond, his decision not to acquire those goods after learning of the breach [must] not [be]
commercially unreasonable." Id (quoting J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 7-10);
see also Blair Int'l, Ltd., 675 F.2d at 960.
150. See U.C.C. § 2-703 (general remedies for sellers). The jobber seller who acquired
the contract goods may recover his lost profits if he is a lost volume seller. See supra notes
114-45.
151. See, e.g., Blair Int'l, Ltd., 675 F.2d 954 (2-708(2) applied to a jobber seller who did
not acquire goods because 2-708(1) measure was inadequate); Nobs Chem., 616 F.2d 212 (2-
708(2) applied to jobber seller who did not acquire contract goods because action for price
under 2-709 and contract-resale measure of 2-706 were not available). See generally J.
WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 7-10.
152. See Nobs Chem., 616 F.2d 212.
153. See supra note 14 (circumstances under which seller may bring an action for price).
154. Under 2-708(1) the seller is awarded the difference between the contract price
and the market price of the goods. The seller without goods with which to recover the
market price is not placed in the same place as full performance. See Blair Int'l, Ltd., 675
F.2d 954.
155. Goetz & Scott, supra note 37, at 357 & n.81.
156. Id The conventional interpretation of market price in 2-708(1) is the price the
seller could receive by selling the contract goods to a buyer in an available market. See
Timber Access Indus. Co., 503 P.2d at 490.
157. See supra note 146 and accompanying text. This interpretation is contrary to the
language of 2-708(1), which provides that the market price be established "at the time and
place for tender." The goods are tendered when the seller holds conforming goods at the
buyer's disposition and gives the seller any reasonable notice necessary to enable him to
take delivery. U.C.C. § 2-503(1). The conventional interpretation of "market price at the
time and place for tender" is the price the seller could receive by selling the contract goods
to a buyer in an available market. See, e.g., Timber Access Indus. Co., 503 P.2d at 490.
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the difference between the contract price and the acquisition price of the
goods.
Goetz and Scott admit that their formula is "merely a mechanism for
recovering the seller's actual profits."158 They claim, however, that the
award of actual lost profits under their formula is preferable to the ex-
pected lost profit award under 2-708(2).159 Goetz and Scott contend that
proof of the contract and wholesale prices under their formula is less
costly than the direct proof of lost profits required under 2-708(2).160
The courts have not adopted Goetz and Scott's hypothesis.16 , There is
little incentive for the courts to adopt such a liberal interpretation of 2-
708(1) when the jobber seller is adequately compensated under 2-708(2).
VII. CONCLUSION
Lost profit recovery is an essential part of a seller's recovery for breach
of contract. Because virtually all sellers enter a contract expecting to
earn profits, the aggrieved seller's damage recovery must include lost
profits to place him in the same position as full performance would have
done. Despite its poor drafting, courts have consistently interpreted
U.C.C. section 2-708(2) to allow lost profit recovery by deserving sellers.
The section expressly recognizes that lost profits, despite their speculative
nature, are a proper measure of damages for breach of contract. Section
2-708(2) thus allows courts to award lost profits to sellers not adequately
compensated by other remedies, and is an essential component of the
seller's remedies provided by the Code.
158. Goetz & Scott, supra note 37, at 357 n.81.
159. Id. According to Goetz and Scott, the jobber seller's actual lost profit is the con-
tract price less the wholesale market price. Id The normal measure of profits under 2-708
is the difference between the contract price and production or acquisition costs. See supra
note 58 and accompanying text. Since the jobber seller did not acquire the goods he can
only prove his expected profit.
160. Goetz and Scott, supra note 37, at 357 n.81.
161. Courts which have addressed the issue unanimously agree that 2-708(2) is the
proper remedy formula for the jobber seller who properly refrains from acquiring the
contract goods. See supra notes 151-54 and accompanying text.
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